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1. Introduction 
This paper starts from the analysis of the relationship between law and 
religion in Germany, trying to answer the question “what is the meaning 
of religion”. This investigation will be carried on by examining German 
Federal Constitutional Court judgements about religion and focusing on 
the legal status of religious communities in Germany. Religion has a deep 
and interactive relationship with other social phenomena that constitute 
a society. Religious values and beliefs affect not only the members of the 
religious community, but also non-members and institutions. Thus, it is 
important to pinpoint some distinctive characteristics of religion both in 
terms of what it is (its essence or meaning) as well as what it does (its 
function).  
The main reasons behind the deep interest that has arisen in Europe in 
the relationship between State and religion is the large increase of 
Muslim immigrants, whose religion sometimes affects their entire life 
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and whose religious communities play an important social and cultural 
role. 
Freedom of religion plays a key role answering the question about the 
meaning of religion in a State, in that it shows the level of secularization 
of that State.  
In order to analyse the meaning of religion in German jurisprudence, it is 
necessary to examine the relationship between religion and state in 
Germany first, and then see how the German Constitutional Court 
interprets constitutional provisions about religion and religious 
communities, as well as the consequences of such regulations in an 
increasingly multi-religious society1.  
Today, a third of the population does not belong to any religious 
confession, and the social relevance of non-Christian faiths is increasing, 
the Islamic one in particular. This is the religion of approximately the 4 
percent of the German population, which is made up of immigrants or 
descendants of former immigrants2. 
Such changes in the social context have made it necessary to deal with 
religious phenomena which the Constitutional fathers would not know. 
                                                 
1 In Germany, during the last sixty years, social, economical and cultural conditions 
changed deeply. In 1950, more than 96 percent of the population in the Federal 
Republic of Germany belonged to one of the major Christian confessions, 50 percent 
were Protestants and about 46 percent belonged to the Catholic confession. Until the 
beginning of the 1960s this situation changed because of process of increasing 
secularization, and the current situation is this: about 31 percent of the population 
belong to Catholic Church and about 30 percent to Protestant confession. 
2 Cfr. G. ROBBERS, Religious Freedom in Germany, in BYU Law Review, n. 
643/2001, http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview/vol2001/iss2/12. 
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This raises the question whether or not the current constitutional 
arrangement is still adequate to meet the needs of the current multi-
religious society.  
Before we analyze the constitutional framework about religious freedom, 
and in order to better understand the evolution of jurisprudence 
concerning the meaning of religion, it could be interesting to take a quick 
look at the history of the relationship between religion and State and its 
legal regulation. From a historical perspective, the relationship between 
church and State is the result of long-lasting conflicts.  
The first major attempt to end the struggle between religions was the 
Peace of Augsburg in 1555, which provided the first legal basis for a 
peaceful co-existence of Catholicism and Lutheranism.  
Through the newly established principle “cuius regio, eius religio”, the 
aristocratic leaders were granted the ius reformandi within their own, 
separate states, i.e. the right to choose their own confession and 
determine that of their citizens.  
Meanwhile, in order to prevent religious civil wars, the princes did grant 
their citizens a ius emigrandi, i.e., the right to leave the State. This “ius 
emigrandi” was the first step toward the acknowledgement of personal 
religious freedom. During the following centuries, the chances of 
religious war would still pose a threat, especially with the Thirty Years 
War. This is how the belief spread out that in order to establish peace it 
was necessary to keep religion out of politics, which then brought about 
a process of separation between religion and politics.  
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Nevertheless, no such utter separation has been the case in Germany due 
to historical reasons, as far as Church and State are concerned3. 
This process by which religion established itself as a field other than 
politics has affected the very definition of religion at a structural level. 
Religion has thus become a private rather than a public matter, requiring 
its own internalized space within “one’s own conscience, the forum 
internum, whereas public ceremonial exercises of faith are increasingly 
limited to non-political aspects”4.  
The idea of separation prevailed firstly with the Protestant Reformation 
and then with the Enlightenment5.  
Though the 1919 Weimar Constitution distinctly stated that the 
establishment of an official State-Church was explicitly forbidden within 
the society, the separation principle as interpreted by jurisprudence is a 
crucial issue. Many new religious movements have proliferated in 
Germany since the end of the Second World War, and the most relevant 
part of them is the result of the growing influx of migrant population. 
 
                                                 
3 About the relationship between Church and State in Germany see, among others, 
E. J. EBERLE, Church and State in Western Society: Established Church, 
Cooperation and Separation, Ashgate, Farham, 2011, 125-153.  
4 K. HEINZ LADEUR, I. AUGSBERG, The Myth of the Neutral State. The relationship 
between state and religion in the face of new challenges, in German Law Journal, n. 
8 /2007, 143. 
5 R. L. JOHNSTONE, Religion a Society in Interaction: The Sociology of Religion, 
Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, n. 9/1970, 965-990.  
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2. The nomen case: the regulation of religious phenomenon in 
German Law.  
The relationship between State and religion is fundamentally regulated by 
the Constitution, the so-called Basic Law (Grundgesetz), which guarantees 
the basic right of religious freedom and undisturbed practice of religion. 
Religious freedom has an important place in Germany’s constitution: the 
main constitutional norm about religious freedom is art. 4 paragraphs 1 
and 2 Grundgesetz, which states individual right to religious freedom and 
obliges the State to respect its citizens and to secure the free 
development of religious activities.  
Art. 4 further protects “the undisturbed practice of religion”, while art. 7 
guarantees religious instruction in public schools and includes the right 
to abstain from that instruction, securing the right to establish and run 
religiously or ideologically based private schools. 
Freedom of religion does not include only freedom of confession, but 
also freedom of worshipping; it guarantees the individual right to lead a 
life according to personal belief. Religious freedom is considered a 
fundamental human right that belongs to all people, not only to German 
citizens, and is also protected in its negative dimension, that is to say the 
freedom not to have any religion.  
The freedom to have or not certain religious or philosophical creed is 
strengthened by the basic right of equality before the law: according to 
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article 3 paragraph 3 of German Constitution, none can be favored or 
disfavored because of his or her personal religious opinions6.  
Germany’s commitment to religious freedom is described firstly in the 
preamble to German constitution, which states: «Conscious of their 
responsibility before God and humankind, animated by the resolve to 
serve world peace as an equal part of a united Europe, the German 
people have adopted, by virtue of their constituent power, this Basic 
Law»7.  
The reference to God does not allude to the establishment of any 
specific religious belief, but expresses the acknowledgment of a sphere of 
transcendence, suggesting that there is something other than the political 
order established by the Constitution, and that the State is not all-
powerful8. 
Article 33 paragraph 3 Grundgesetz specifies that «neither the enjoyment 
of civil and political rights, nor eligibility for neither public office, nor 
rights acquired in the public service shall be dependent upon religious 
                                                 
6 In Germany is explicit the extension of freedom to profess creed to ideological, 
nonreligious belief, as well as religious belief. Belief in nature or philosophical or 
existential belief could both fall within the ambit of article 4 of Constitution. Cfr. E. 
EBERLE, Free Exercise of Religion in Germany and the United States, in Tulane Law 
Review, n. 4/2004, 1023 ss.  
7 M. SILAGI, The Preamble of the German Grundgesetz–Constitutional Status and 
Importance of Preambles in German Law, in Acta Juridica Hungarica, n. 1/2011, 
pp. 54–63.  
8 Cfr. G. ROBBERS, op. cit., 643-668.  
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affiliation. No one may be disadvantaged by reason of adherence or non-
adherence to a particular religious denomination or philosophical creed». 
In order to rule the relationship between State and religious 
communities, the Grundgesetz incorporated provisions of articles 136, 137, 
138, 139 and 141 of German Constitution of 11 August 1919 (Weimar 
Constitution), that are considered integral part of German Basic Law9.  
Unlike the individual approach of article 4 Grundgesetz these rules, which 
have been incorporated from the Weimar Constitution, regulate the 
collective dimension of religious freedom, establishing a complex 
balance between the principle of separation and that of cooperation 
between State and religious communities.  
Article 137 paragraph 1 of Weimar Constitution, as cited by art. 140 of 
Grundgesetz, provides for a separation between religion and State, 
confirming their autonomy: it declares that all religious societies shall 
regulate and administer their affairs independently within the limits of 
the law.  
This meaning of separation must not be intended as the French concept 
of laïcité, which excludes the presence of any religious element from the 
public sphere. The German principle of separation does still leave room 
to areas of cooperation between State and religious groups, only 
                                                 
9 According to the German Constitutional Court, the Bundesverfassungsgericht, this 
technique does not imply a minor status of the incorporated norms. Rather, they are 
a fully effective, integral part of the constitution. 
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prohibiting those forms of cooperation which integrate religious 
communities into the State organization10. 
Art. 137 grants the freeedom of association to form religious bodies to 
“regulate and administer its affairs autonomously” and the ability to 
constitute religious bodies to “acquire legal capacity according to the 
general provisions of civil law”. According to art. 140 GG and art. 137 
paragraph 5 of Weimar Constitution, “Religious societies shall remain 
corporations under public law insofar as they have enjoyed that status in 
the past. Other religious societies shall be granted the same status upon 
application, if their constitution and the number of their members give 
assurance of their permanency.”  
The most important consequence of this status as public corporations is 
indicated in the following paragraph, which provides that religious 
societies that have achieved this status are entitled to levy taxes on the 
basis of the civil taxation list. 
However, the possibility to acquire the status of public corporations does 
not contradict the general principle that there is no state Church: in fact, 
                                                 
10 Cooperation between distinct groups is a trait of German society, perhaps 
reflecting and infusing the communitarian bent of the society. «To try seriously to 
separate church and society is to attempt the impossible so long as church and state 
exist side by side in society. They interact; they overlap; they touch the same people; 
they seek commitment and involvement from the same people. (…) The most 
prevalent relationship between religion and state in our contemporary world could 
be characterized as partial separation. Most societies today exhibit some variation on 
this pattern, that is, some independence for both the political and religious 
institutions, but some overlapping and mutual influences as well». Cfr. W. WEIΒ, A. 
ADOGAME, The interplay of religion and law in Germany, in Religio: Revue pro 
religionistiku, vol. 3/2000, 41-64. 
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despite their status as corporations under public law, religious 
communities remain distinct from the State and do not become integral 
part of the State organization.  
In contrast to ordinary corporations, there is no such thing under public 
law as state supervision of the internal proceedings within the religious 
communities; therefore the status of corporation under public law does 
not modify the general state-church relationship. According to the 
judgments of the Bundesverfassungsgericht, the status does not alter the 
churches’ “fundamental independence from the state. Rather, this 
independence shall be confirmed therewith”11.  
The principle of State neutrality has important consequences for the legal 
definition of religion: in a neutral State, public authority doesn’t have the 
power to define what can be classified as religion and religious 
behaviour.  
The various freedoms which are granted to religious institutions in 
Germany can be found in German constitution, in the constitutions of 
the German Länder and in ordinary laws, as well as in the various treaties 
between the State and specific religions12. 
The main idea of freedom means that all religious beliefs are free: in 
addition to mere toleration, German political system supports the idea of 
positive freedom. While government must not forbid certain beliefs nor 
                                                 
11 See BVerfGE 30, 415, 428. 
12 Cfr. E. EBERLE, Church and State in Western Society: Established Church, 
Cooperation and Separation, Routledge, Oxford, 2011.  
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discriminate against them, it must also go further to create a positive 
atmosphere of integration within the society.  
In order to explain the idea of positive religious freedom, the Federal 
Constitutional Court judgement about Baha’ì religion can be mentioned 
as an example. In that case, the Court decided that the general 
association law of Germany must be interpreted in a manner compatible 
with the specific religious needs of the Bahá’í. The general interpretation 
of the law on associations normally requires each registered association 
to have a legally independent board of governors. The Court held that, 
because of religious liberty, the local associations of the Bahá’í, are free 
to formally affiliate themselves with one national board of governors13.  
State authorities (administration, legislator and judges) must not interfere 
in religious affairs and they have to guarantee the freedom of religious 
groups and religious pluralism: religious freedom can be guaranteed by 
keeping equidistance to all religious denominations. This does not only 
mean that the State has to be neutral when it comes to religions, but also 
that State cannot give a definition of what religion is or ought to be14. 
                                                 
13 BVerfGE 83, 341. Cfr. E. EBERLE, German religious freedom: the movement 
toward the protection of minorities, in A. RUSSELL MILLER, P. ZUMBANSEN, Annual 
of German & European Law, vol. II - III, 2007, 15 ss.  
14 “The wisest position for the law is a frank recognition that it cannot under-stand or 
represent religious experience with anything like fullness or accuracy”. Cfr. J. BOYD 
WHITE, Talking About Religion in the Language of Law, in J. BOYD WHITE (ed. by), 
From Expectation to Experience: Essays on Law and Legal Education, Michigan 
Publishing, Ann Arbor, 1999, 124. 
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The wisest position for the law is a frank recognition that it cannot 
understand or represent religious experience with anything like fullness 
or accuracy.  
 
3. The meaning of religion in German Constitutional Court.  
The answer to the question “what is the meaning of religion” derives 
from German constitutional law, as developed by the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht. The legal meaning of religion is based on the self-
conception of religious communities, but this requisite is not sufficient, 
because the definition of the exact meaning of “religion” plays an 
important role when State has to respond to the needs of groups that 
require protection by invoking the exercise of religious freedom15.  
Self-determination is translated in German “Selbstbestimmungsgarantie”, 
which directly refers to guarantee of self-determination that has to be 
considered valid both for individuals and for religious communities and 
associations. However, the specific importance of religious self-
conception is the result of a developing jurisdiction. Former decisions of 
the Bundesverfassungsgericht show how there have been attempts to 
establish narrower and more concrete definitions of “religion”. In 1960 
the German Federal Constitutional Court tried to establish a “clause of 
adequacy of culture” determining religions with regard to “those 
                                                 
15 J. BOYD WHITE (ed. by), How should we talk about religion? Perspectives, 
contexts, particularities, Notre Dame Press, South Band, 2006. 
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confessions which have in the course of time been developed by civilized 
people on the basis of common moral convictions”16. 
This definition did not respect the constitutional obligation of state 
neutrality, though, which is why later jurisdiction abandoned it. 
The most important case in which the meaning of religion and the 
criterium of self conception were discussed was the Rumpelkammer case in 
1968: in that case the Court had to decide if a clothing drive conducted 
by a Catholic youth organisation for caritative purposes has to be 
considered a religious activity with a special legal treatment. In the 
judgement the Court expressed the principle that religion had to be 
                                                 
16 BVerfGE 12, 1. For a comment see S. KORIOTH – I. AUGSBERG, ‘Religion and the 
Secular State in Germany,’ in Re-ligion and the Secular State / La religion et l’État 
laïque: Interim National Reports / Rapports Nationaux Intermédiaires, issued for 
the occasion of the XVIIIth International Congress of Comparative Law, 
Washington, D.C. – https://www.iclrs.org/content/blurb/files/Germany.pdf., July 
2010, 320. In that case the Court decided about the behaviour of an anti-Christian 
activist, that was member of a radical nationalist, movement the “Tannenberg-
Bund”. In the 1950es he worked as a spy for the Soviet Union, was uncovered and 
sentenced to four years in prison. In prison he tried to move his prison inmates to 
leave the Church, offering them tobacco if they did so. This behaviour was 
considered a sign of moral wretchedness precluding any expectation of a law-
abiding and life in freedom. The appellant regarded this statement as an 
infringement of his (negative) religious freedom. The Federal Constitutional Court, 
so, established its “clause of adequacy” and, denying that the activities of the 
appellant had anything to do with religious freedom, rejected his legal opinion and 
introduced the clause into the legal discourse not in order to exclude a positive 
statement of supposedly religious character, but in order to prevent a claim of anti-
religious activity by a former Nazi. Of course this explanation of the circumstances 
of the case does not jusitify the clause. 
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protected “as long as it remains within the framework of certain 
consistent moral opinions of today’s civilised peoples”17.  
Besides, in Rumpelkammer case the Federal Constitutional Court 
established the principle that the state would infringe upon the 
autonomy of religious communities as guaranteed by the Grundgesetz if it 
did not pay attention to the religious self-consideration.  
Trying to understand which possible forms of behaviour might be 
considered as visible religious manifestions, the Court emphasised the 
importance of religious self-consideration and concluded that, according 
to Christian self-conception, caritative activities represent part of the 
exercise of religion, and so the clothing drive could be regarded as a 
religious practice and therefore ought to be granted constitutional 
protection.  
Thus the self-consideration of religious groups, intended as an 
expression of state neutrality, became a decisive factor not only for 
determining the range of religiously motivated forms of behaviour, but 
also for the definition of religion itself.  
As a consequence many formal definitions can be found nowadays of 
what can be considered religion or religious group.  
The basic definition of religion is a particular conception of the world, 
from which human life itself derives its origin and goal. Religious faith is 
a system of doctrines connecting the human being with a transcendent 
                                                 
17 BVerfGE 24, 236. 
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principle that can neither be perceived and judged by human standards, 
nor fully explained by scientific knowledge.  
Religion provides the human being with a basis of a transcendent and 
encompassing reality; it has been defined as “an assurance regarding the 
existence and the content of certain truths being connected to a human 
being”18, but to elaborate a set of parameters which may evaluate 
external manifestation of religious faith is not an easy task, if we consider 
that the German society is characterized by an increasing multi-
religiosity, that cannot be reduced to a homogeneous view.  
However, if the only prerequisite to be met would be the self-
consideration of a group, the freedom of faith would be transformed 
into a right for all possible human behaviour: for this reason some 
precautionary measures are necessary, which ought to prevent misuses of 
religious freedom, requiring objective criteria.  
Religion is a phenomenon that involves a group of people rather than an 
individualistic belief. One might also find legal arguments that justify this 
kind of differentiation: with regard to fundamental rights catalogue as 
presented by the German Grundgesetz, it can be argued that there does 
exist a specific legal guarantee for the individual decision, that is, the 
freedom of conscience. According to this theory, freedom of conscience 
guarantees personal conviction, while religious freedom regards a whole 
group of people who share the same belief.  
                                                 
18 BVerfGE 32, 98, 107. 
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Public authority doesn’t have the competence to judge whether a certain 
faith is right or wrong, but case law of Federal Courts publicly criticizes 
the effects and teachings of religious groups and consequently issue 
warnings, if a danger for phisycal and psychological integrity is perceived.  
For this reason, Federal Courts and some regional governments in 
official pronouncements warned of new religious developments and so 
called “youth religions”, “sects” and “cults”19.  
In order to verify whether or not a certain behaviour may be classified as 
religious and shall as such be granted specific legal protection, some 
form of State control must be elaborated 20.  
With regard to the central role of religious communities’ self-conception, 
the necessary state control is limited to a form of “plausibility check”. 
Only if a certain group evidently misuses the idea of religious freedom in 
order, e.g., to use it for obviously economic purposes, may the state 
intervene.  
                                                 
19 German Parliament commissioned an enquiry towards investigating such groups, 
in order to find out what conflicts could be ascribed to the new religious and 
ideological communities and psychogroups, and in order to decide whether 
governmental astio are required. Cfr. Final Report of the Commission of Enquiry of 
the Bundestag (the German Parliament) on "so-called Sects and Psycho Groups", 
Bonn 1998, on line at 
https://archive.org/stream/FinalReportOfTheEnqueteCommissionOnSoCalled 
SectsAndPsychogroups. 
20 See Federal Constitutional Court BVerfGE 83, 341, ruling that art. 4 self-
autonomy allows Baha’i religion to rule itself as it likes, even when supreme 
religious authorities outside Germany order affairs differently than communities 
within Germany. Cfr. E. EBERLE, German religious freedom: the movement toward 
protection of minorities, cit., 20.  
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This issue has been discussed with regard to the Church of Scientology 
and Jehovah’s Witnesses.  
The Federal Labour Court decreed that Scientology was not a religion or 
creed, because Scientology used the name of a church as a pretense for 
economic purposes21.  
A religious group may, and usually does, carry on different activities 
which are not merely religious, but it must not lose its peculiar religious 
character.  
According to decisions of the Federal Administrative Court the 
government can even, without a concrete danger for the rights of others, 
criticize some religious teaching if and insofar as this teaching 
considerably contradicts the "axiology" which results out of the 
fundamental, basic rights of the Basic Law.  
This can be the case if statements of a religious community are 
influenced by a different concept of human dignity or the value of 
human life. As we have seen before, religion impacts the social structure: 
for this reason, the State will be favourably disposed towards religious 
groups if they have a positive impact on the society and if that creed 
shares some positive values with the state. On the other hand, legal 
restraints are set up for groups which the State holds to have a negative 
                                                 
21 See furthermore S. MUCKEL, The ‘Church of Scientology’ under German Law on 
Church and State, in German Yearbook of International Law, n. 41/1999, 299. The 
Federal Labour Court ruled that Scientology was not a religion or creed. According 
to the ruling, Scientology used the name of a church as a pretence for economic 
purposes. 
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influence on its members and are considered as potentially dangerous for 
citizens. In 1997 the Federal Administrative Court in Berlin upheld a 
1993 Berlin State Government's decision about Jehovah's Witnesses that 
had denied the church public law corporation status.  
The Court decided that the group did not offer the “indispensable 
loyalty” towards the democratic state “essential for lasting cooperation” 
because it forbade its members to participate in public elections. On 
December 2000, the Constitutional Court decided in favour of Jehovah's 
Witnesses, remanding the case back to the Federal Administrative Court 
in Berlin. For the first time, the Constitutional Court examined the 
conditions for granting the status of a public law corporation, saying that 
the “loyalty to the state” cannot be considered a condition imposed on 
religious communities22.  
As long as a religious community does not attempt to overthrow the 
current legal system in order to install a theocratic regime and as long as 
it respects the citizens’ fundamental rights and the principle of religious 
tolerance, its attitude towards the state is an inner religious phenomenon 
which the state may not criticise23. 
According to the jurisdiction of the Bundesverfassungsgericht, the neutrality 
imposed on the state “has to be understood as an open and 
comprehensive attitude which supports religious freedom of all 
                                                 
22 Cfr. E. EBERLE, Church and State in Western Society: Established Church, 
Cooperation and separation, Routledge, London, 2016, 141 ss.  
23 See BVerfGE 102, 370, 395. 
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confessions in an equal manner”24.  
Not all the recipients of the right to freedom of religion are Christians or 
members of the predominant confessions: all religious groups are 
included, and one of the parameters the Courts use in order to 
individuate a religious group is the size of membership25.  
 
4. Conclusions. 
As we have seen before, according to article 137 (5) of the Weimar 
Constitution, religious communities are granted the status of public 
corporations “where their constitution and the number of their members 
offer an assurance of their permanency”. The parameter of 
“permanency” has to be referred to the whole condition of the 
community, considering the meaning of the special status of public 
corporations in Germany.  
The requirement of a specific number of members is not clarified in the 
Basic Law, but it should be large enough to demonstrate that the 
religious community has some relevance in public life. However, some 
Länder have granted the status of a public corporation to much smaller 
groups. For example, the status of public corporation was granted to the 
Christian Science Movement in Bavaria in 1949, even though the group 
had only four hundred members. 
                                                 
24 See BVerfGE 108, 282, 300, cited in S. KORIOTH, I. AUGSBERG, op. cit.  
25 D. P. KOMMERS, The constitutional jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of 
Germany, Duke University Press, Durham, 1989.  
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The State grants the special status of public corporations to churches 
and religious communities because of their impact and relevance for the 
larger society. Nonetheless, the qualification as public corporation is a 
useful, although not necessary consequence of the public importance of 
religious communities. According to the judgements of the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht, the status of public corporation does not alter the 
fundamental independence of churches from the state, but such 
independence is rather confirmed therewith. 
Besides, further criteria to individuate a religion are the level of 
continuity of that religious community, its international popularity and its 
geographical spread.26  
Dealing with religious pluralism necessarily requires a clear definition of 
its own object. This problem that law has to solve becomes particularly 
important in an eterogenic society. When Europe was characterised by 
the dominance of the two major Christian confessions, the question of 
what could legitimately be called a religion was quite irrelevant. By 
contrast, the recent religious pluralism reveals that the traditional 
concept of religion is deeply influenced by Western Christian values that 
might not be adequate in order to deal with newly emerging phenomena.  
In this context, state orientation to criteria indicated basically by religious 
communities offers the legal system the opportunity to recognise religion 
as a completely distinct phenomenon without losing its grip on it as a 
potential object of legal treatment, including legal restrictions. 
                                                 
26 W. WEIΒ, A. ADOGAME, op. cit, 35 ss. 
